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Valuing the Environmental Impacts of Electricity 
Generation: A Critical Survey 
Thomas Sundqvist and Patrik Soderholm 
Abstract 
This article provides a critical survey of a large number of studies carried out during the 
1980s and 1990s that have focused on valuing the external, primarily environmental, costs 
associated with electricity generation. It discusses a number of conceptual, policy-related 
and, in some cases, unresolved questions in the economic valuation of these types of 
impacts. These include: (a) the definition of externalities; (b) the choices of scope, relevant 
parameter input assumptions, and methodology; (c) the role of 'green' consumer demand 
in replacing environmental cost assessments; and (d) the behavioural assumptions 
underlying environmental impact valuation. By analysing these issues we gain an increased 
understanding of the reasons for the wide disparity in external cost estimates reported in 
previous studies. The article also concludes that in cases where the results of electricity 
externality studies are utilised as a basis for policy purposes, a conflict between the 
economic efficiency criterion, its theoretical foundations and other - not necessarily less 
legitimate - goals of policy may exist. 
Keywords: Electricity Generation, Environmental Impacts, Externalities, Valuation, Survey. 
1. Introduction 
Electric power production plays a vital role in modern societies, but it also 
gives rise to negative impacts on the environment such as the pollution of air, 
water and soil. A large number of regulations and economic incentives exist 
worldwide to promote the introduction of more environmentally benign power 
generation technologies. However, when implementing such policy efforts 
two questions normally arise: (a) what technologies should be considered 
environmentally benign; and (b) how does one find a proper balance between 
the benefits of electricity production and the costs of environmental 
degradation? During the last decades policy makers have shown an increased 
interest in the general recommendations found in the economics literature. 
According to this strand of research the answers to the above questions lie in 
applying economic non-market valuation techniques to the specific environ-
mental (and non-environmental) impacts that can be labelled externalities. 
Formally an externality, i.e., an external cost or benefit, is defined as an 
unpriced and uncompensated side effect of one agent's actions (in our case 
electric utilities) that directly affects the welfare of another agent (Baumol 
and Oates 1988). Since these effects are not reflected in market prices, there 
exists a need to assist market processes by assigning them monetary values 
and in this way integrate them into private and public decision-making. 
In the early 1980s studies that explicitly attempted to assess and value 
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environmental impacts in the power sector began to emerge (e.g., Schuman 
and Cavanagh 1982). During the 1990s there was a surge in the number of 
externality valuation analyses conducted, in large part due to increased 
attention from policy makers in Europe, with the ExtemE-project (EC 1995; 
1999), and in the USA (e.g., Rowe et al. 1995; ORNL and RfF 1994-1998). 
The results and the methods of many of these studies have been utilised as 
inputs in important modelling work and have served as vehicles in developing 
additional methodological work in the environment and energy field (Krewitt 
2002). For instance, past studies on how different environmental regulation 
schemes affect national energy systems have made use of external cost 
adders .' Still, so far the results from previous studies have only to a limited 
extent significantly affected actual policy decisions. Some authors argue that 
this is because electricity environmental impact studies may have raised more 
questions than they have answered, and that there exist important limits to 
their usefulness in deriving policy-oriented recommendations (e.g., Stirling 
1997). 
The main purpose of this article is to provide a critical survey of previous 
external cost studies in the power sector, and with this survey as a basis 
discuss a number of conceptual and still unresolved issues in the economic 
valuation of electricity related environmental impacts. A number of important 
issues are identified and discussed but overall we focus especially on two 
interrelated questions: (a) the wide disparity in external damage costs reported 
in previous studies, and the extent to which this represents a problem; and 
(b) the usefulness of previous valuation efforts for policy purposes. One of 
the main theses of the article is that in cases where the results from valuation 
studies are used for policy purposes, there may exist a conflict between the 
theoretical foundations of environmental impact valuation, the related choice 
of economic efficiency as a policy goal, and the more pragmatic (but not 
necessarily less legitimate) policy goals pursued in practice. Also, the question 
of whether the wide disparity of estimates represents a problem cannot be 
answered unless the circumstances under which the results are to be used for 
policy purposes are clarified. 
Previous studies have also critically surveyed past research on electricity 
externalities. See, in particular, OTA (1994), Ki.ihn (1996; 1998), Lee (1997), 
Ottinger (1997), Stirling (1997; 1998), Schleisner (2000), and Krewitt (2002). 
In contrast to these earlier survey studies, which typically focus on the 
procedure of generating impact estimates, we focus on broader theoretical 
issues and especially on the use of these estimates in policy making. Moreover, 
while earlier surveys focus on a few selected studies we consider the results, 
methods, and scope of about forty different externality studies. This enables 
us to draw more general conclusions about the usefulness and the limits of 
the work conducted in this field. 
Before proceeding an important semantic issue should be clarified. In 
this article we focus primarily, but not solely, on the valuation of 
See, for instance, Bigano et al. (2000) (for Belgium), and Vennerno and Halseth 
(2001) (for Norway). 
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environmental externalities in the power sector. An environmental impact, 
whether negative or positive, is not necessarily an environmental externality 
(see section 2) in the sense that it is not reflected in market prices. Still, the 
environmental impacts referred to in this article are mostly environmental 
externalities as well, and the terms are therefore largely used interchangeably. 
Still, in many instances we simply revert to the more general term externality, 
which embraces both environmental and non-environmental externalities. 
In section 2 the theoretical and practical issues related to externality 
assessment and environmental valuation are briefly introduced. Section 3 
presents an overview of a large number of previously conducted electricity 
externality studies. In section 4, we identify and analyse six fundamental and 
policy relevant issues raised by the empirical attempts at valuing electricity 
externalities. The article ends with a summary of the main findings in 
section 5. 
2. The Valuation of Externalities in Theory and in Practice 
Externalities occur as a result of both consumption and production activities 
and they are the causes of market failures, something that in turn leads to a 
resource allocation that is non-optimal from society's point of view. Hence, 
theoretically an externality causes a type of situation in which the First 
Theorem of Welfare Economics fails to apply, and markets fail at 
accomplishing Pareto efficiency. 2 Specifically, in the case of a negative 
externality, there exists a difference between the private and the social costs 
of an activity. The private costs facing a producer measure the best alternative 
uses of resources available as reflected by the market prices of the specific 
resources used by the producer. The social costs of production, however, 
equal private costs plus external costs (Figure 1 ), and measure the best 
alternative use of resources available to society as a whole. Since there is a 
lack of market for the external impact, a profit-maximising producer has no 
incentive to integrate this effect into the decision-making process. Thus private 
costs are lower than the social costs. The difference between private and 
external costs is, however, not 'fixed'. If the external costs can be 'internalised' 
(i.e., made private), decision-makers will have an incentive to undertake 
actions that help mitigate, for instance, the negative environmental impacts 
arising from electricity generation. 
In his seminal work Coase (1960) demonstrates that bargaining between 
the polluter and affected agents can, under certain circumstances (such as 
low transaction costs and full information), internalise externalities and 
achieve an efficient outcome. However, in most cases, due to the large number 
of parties involved, some kind of government intervention is called for. One 
way of correcting the inefficiency of an external cost is the use of so-called 
2 It should be noted that the market failure requirement ensures that the focus is on 
externalities that directly affect economic efficiency, i.e., technological (rather than 
pecuniary) externalities (Baumol and Oates, 1988). 
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Figure 1: Total Costs to Society of a Productive Activity 
Source: IEA (1995). 
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Pigovian taxes as originally suggested by Pigou (1924). This implies setting 
a tax equal to the value of the marginal external cost (at the optimum level 
of the activity in question) so that the private decision maker is provided with 
an incentive to economise not only on the traditional input factors but also on 
unpriced goods and services such as those provided by the natural 
environment. However, this solution to the externality problem requires that 
the tax authority is able to identify the external cost function. How do we go 
about assessing the size of this function, and hence the value of the damage 
caused by a negative externality (or the benefits incurred by a positive one)? 
The theoretical bases of such valuation exercises and the practical approaches 
used to empirically elicit these values are discussed below. 
Externality Valuation in Economic Theory 
The theoretical basis of the economic valuation of externalities is outlined in 
the welfare economics literature. This strand of research recognises that the 
economic value of a resource or service is ultimately a function of individual 
preferences, and the tool for analysing welfare changes is therefore utility 
theory. Our focus is on the economic valuation of an environmental good, but 
the general concepts are applicable to the valuation of all non-market goods. 
Following Perman et al. (1999), consider an individual that derives utility 
(U) from two goods, Q and Y. Q represents an environmental 'good' that the 
individual consumes and Y all other consumption possibilities available to 
the individual. Changes in the level of Q can refer to quantity changes or 
quality changes depending upon the type of environmental service involved. 
Assume that Q is a public good that is non-exclusive and non-divisible, so 
that the individual cannot adjust his or her consumption level. Now consider 
a project (e.g., a policy change) that, ceteris paribus, causes the environmental 
quality to increase (or improve) from Q' to Q' (see Figure 2). The project 
causes a positive change in the utility (or welfare) for the individual 
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(represented by the move from indifference curve U0 to indifference curve U). Given the presence of the project the individual is thus made better off. 
However, since utility is not directly observable and since environmental 
'goods' are not part of market transactions we need to find alternative ways 
of assessing the value of this welfare change. Theoretically two standard 
monetary measures of quality based welfare changes are the compensating 
and the equivalent surplus. 
To find the first of these measures, compensating surplus (CS), we start 
by noting that an increase in Q, everything else held constant, is equivalent 
to a reduction in the price of Q. And since the slope of the budget line is 
given by the relative price, the budget line (representing the individual's 
consumption possibilities) will change from a-b to a-c. In order to identify 
CS in Figure 2a we, hypothetically, constrain the individual at the pre-change 
environmental quality level (Q ') and utility level ( U0) by taking away just 
enough of the individual's income so that he or she can just afford to consume 
at the pre-change level (represented by the 'dotted' budget line d-e). CS is 
then a-d or the amount of money, that if foregone by the individual with the 
policy change, would result in him or her experiencing the pre-change level 
of utility or, in other words, the maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for the 
environmental improvement. 
y 
u, 
Q' b Q"e c Q Q' g Q" k h Q 
(a) (b) 
Figure 2: Compensating Surplus (CS) and Equivalent Surplus (ES) 
The derivation of the equivalent surplus (ES) measure is presented in 
Figure 2b. ES is given by j-f and it is the amount that, at the original prices, 
would, if paid to the individual, result in him or her experiencing the same 
level of utility as the environmental improvement would have done, given 
that the environmental improvement, hypothetically, does not take place. 
Here ES thus equals the minimum willingness to accept (WTA) compensation 
for the environmental improvement not occurring. The interpretations of the 
CS and ES measures are reversed in the case of environmental quality 
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deteriorations; CS is then equal to the minimum WTA and ES would be the 
maximum WTP. 
In empirical studies it is generally the case that WTA measures tend to be 
substantially higher than WTP measures for the same change (e.g., Kahnemann 
et al. 1990). Thus, the choice of WTP or WTA as a measure of economic 
value may significantly affect the size of the resulting valuation estimate. 
Even though there exist theoretical reasons for this difference (e.g., Hanemann 
1991), WTP is generally being advocated as the most appropriate measure of 
changes in welfare, primarily since WTA is not constrained by income and 
therefore creates an incentive problem (e.g., Arrow et al. 1993). 
In sum, the economic valuation of many environmental (and non-
environmental) impacts, builds on the assumption that people seek to satisfy 
their preferences, which are exogenously determined, complete, continuous, 
and ethically unchallengeable (subjective) . The environment is essentially 
treated as a~y other private commodity, and people are willing to consider 
tradeoffs in relation to the quantity or quality of environmental 'goods'. 
According to the welfare economics literature the appropriate role of policy 
in the field of energy externalities would be to aggregate the monetary 
estimates of individual preferences and weigh them against other (more 
tangible) economic benefits and costs. Thus, the economics of non-market 
valuation builds on: (a) clear but also relatively restrictive behavioural 
assumptions (i.e., utility maximisation); (b) a sense of society as the sum of 
the preferences of its individual members; and (c) a view of the task of 
public policy involving the internalisation of external impacts and with 
utilitarianism as the ethical principle guiding social choice. 
Externality Valuation in Practice 
In practice there are two basic methodological approaches used for the 
valuation of externality impacts in the energy sector: the abatement cost 
approach and the damage cost approach. 
The abatement cost approach uses the costs of controlling or mitigating 
damage or the costs of meeting legislated regulations as an implicit value of 
the damage avoided. The rationale behind this approach is that legislatures 
are assumed to have considered the willingness of the public to pay for 
alleviation of the damage in setting the standard, thus providing a revealed 
preference damage estimate no less reliable than the more direct valuation 
methods (see below). Pearce et al. (1992) stress that one of the serious 
caveats with the approach is that it relies on the rather strong assumption that 
these same decision makers make optimal decisions, i.e., they know the true 
abatement and damage costs. Figure 3 illustrates this problem. It displays the 
marginal abatement cost curve (MAC) and the marginal damage cost curve 
(MDC) resulting from some emissions (E). Thus, increased abatement is 
equivalent to lowered emissions (i.e., damage). Given that the curve MDC 
shows the true disutility of the damage done by the emissions, and if decision 
makers set a maximum standard of emissions at E3, the abatement cost will 
underestimate the true damage cost, while if only emissions up to E 1 are 
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Figure 3: Marginal Abatement and Damage Costs 
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permitted the abatement cost will provide an overestimation. Only at E2 
marginal abatement costs correctly measure marginal damage costs . A 
necessary condition for social optimality, as Joskow (1992) notes, is that the 
abatement costs used are derived from the pollution control strategy that 
provides the least cost of control. If not, the estimates cannot adequately 
reflect damage costs. 
Another limitation of the abatement cost approach, as noted by Bemow 
and Marron (1990), is that society's preferences change over time as 
information, analysis, values and policies change. Hence, past revealed 
preferences might bear little relation to actual impacts today and their current 
value to society. For instance, the implicit value of C02 emissions indicated 
by a revealed preference analysis would in many cases be very low since 
there still exist relatively few regulations targeted towards this problem.3 
This built-in 'tautology' of the approach means that estimates need to be 
constantly revised as regulations and policies change. More importantly 
perhaps, since policy is (per definition) optimal the abatement cost analysis 
provides no room for relevant policy implications, and one must therefore 
question why the analysis is needed in the first place. 
The damage cost approach is aimed at measuring the net economic 
damage arising from negative externalities by focusing more or less directly 
3 One alternative that is often advocated (see, for instance, Ottinger 1997), is to use 
control costs for existing (but not necessarily required) technologies (e.g., carbon 
sequestration in the case of C02 emissions). However, these estimates may not bear 
any relation to people's preferences towards the environment. The relevant policy 
question is whether people value the environment high enough so that the use of 
these control methods can be motivated, and this question cannot be answered by 
equalling held values with the control costs . 
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on explicitly expressed preferences. This approach can be subdivided into 
two main categories: top-down and bottom-up. Top-down approaches make 
use of highly aggregated data to estimate the environmental costs of, say, a 
particular pollutant. Top-down studies are typically carried out at the national 
or the regional level, using estimates of total quantities of pollutants and 
estimates of total damage caused by the pollutants. Specifically some estimate 
of national damage is divided by total pollutant depositions to obtain a 
measure of physical damage per unit of pollutant (Figure 4). These physical 
damages are then attributed to power plants and converted to damage costs 
using available monetary estimates on the damages arising from the pollutants 
under study. The main critique against the top-down approach is that it 
'generically' cannot take into account the site specificity of many types of 
impacts, nor the different stages of the fuel cycle. Another argument that has 
been raised against the approach is that it is derivative since it depends 
mostly on previous estimates and approximations (Clarke 1996). 
National damage 
estimate 
National estimate of % of damage 
pollutant from activity attributable to activity 
I 
i 
Estimated damage/unit of 
pollutant from activity 
Figure 4: The Top-Down Approach 
Source: EC (1995). 
In the bottom-up approach environmental damages from a single source 
are typically traced, quantified and monetised through damage functions/ 
impact pathways (see Figure 5). This method makes use of technology-specific 
data, combined with dispersion models, information on receptors, and dose-
response functions to calculate the impacts of specific externalities. The 
bottom-up approach has been criticised since applications of the method 
have unveiled a tendency for only a subset of impacts to be included in 
assessments, focusing on areas where data is readily available and where, 
thus, impact pathways can easily be established. Consequently bottom-up 
studies tend, it is argued, to leave out potentially important impacts where 
data are not readily available (Clarke 1996). Also, Bernow et al. (1993) 
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caution that the bottom-up approach relies on models that may not adequately 
account for complexities in 'the real world', especially noting that there may 
be synergy effects between pollutants and environmental stresses, and that 
there may be problems in establishing the timing of effects (i.e., between 
exposure and impact). The argument is hence that bottom-up approaches 
may not be sufficiently transparent. Still, this is the approach that, due to its 
focus on explicit estimates of economic welfare (rather than implicit such as 
in the abatement cost approach), appears to be most in line with economic 
theory. As is evident by the methodological choices of recent extemality 
studies it is also the most preferred approach to the empirical assessment of 
externalities in the electricity sector (see section 3). 
Fuel Cycle 
Ambient 
Conditions 
Stock of Assets; 
Individuals 
• Technology 
• Fuel 
Abatement 
technology 
Location 
Emissions & other 
impacts 
Changed Concentrations 
and Other Conditions, by 
Location 
Internalized 
Damages & 
Benefits 
External 
Damages & 
Benefits 
'--------' 
Figure 5: The Impact Pathway (Bottom-Up Approach) 
Source: ORNL and RfF (1994). 
1. Name activities 
and estimate their 
emissions and 
other impacts 
2. Model dispersion 
and change in 
concentrations 
of pollutants 
3. Physically quantify 
emissions and 
other impacts 
4. Translate physical 
quantities into 
economic damages 
and benefits 
} 
S. ~~=;1;a~:~:s 
from internalized 
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There are several ways of addressing the problem of placing a monetary 
value on externalities in general and environmental impacts in particular. The 
first two approaches discussed above (abatement cost and top-down damage 
cost) directly give a monetary estimate of the damage associated with an 
environmental impact. The third approach, bottom-up damage cost, however, 
needs to translate the identified and physically quantified impacts into 
monetary terms. Generally it can be said that whenever market prices can be 
used as a basis for valuation, they should be used. However, since externalities 
by definition are external to markets, most impacts from externalities are not 
reflected in existing prices. Consequently, any attempt to monetise an 
environmental impact using bottom-up damage costing needs to rely on impact 
valuation methods. These methods can be sub-divided into direct and indirect 
methods. Figure 6 illustrates the various methods available for monetising 
environmental impacts.4 
Even if no information is available from existing markets, it may be 
possible to derive values using direct methods that simulate a market. These 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
Observable market 
Market prices Indirect methods 
Productivity Income 
changes changes 
Figure 6: Overview of Impact Valuation Methods 
Hedonic 
pricing 
No observable market 
Di reel methods 
4 There exists an extensive literature on different environmental valuation methods, 
and to review this in detail here would be beyond the scope of this paper. For an 
excellent overview, however, see Garrod and Willis (1999). 
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methods are direct in the sense that they are based on direct questions about 
- or are designed to directly elicit - WTP. An important advantage of the 
direct methods is that they can assess total economic values, i.e., use as well 
as non-use values (such as existence values). Well-known direct valuation 
methods include contingent valuation and stated preference (e.g., choice 
experiment). 
None of the indirect methods can assess non-use values of the environ-
ment; they are based on the actual (rather than the hypothetical) behaviour of 
individuals. Either the environmental values show up as changes in costs or 
revenues on observable markets or in markets closely related to the resource 
that is affected by the environmental impact. The damage is thus valued 
indirectly using a relationship between the environmental impact and some 
good that is traded in a market. Examples of indirect valuation methods are 
hedonic pricing, travel costs, and replacement costs. 
There are also methods that do not easily fit into the categories discussed 
above but that may nevertheless prove useful. The first of these, so-called 
benefit transfers, does not involve any valuation in itself. Benefit transfers 
instead make use of the results of previous studies that have derived monetary 
estimates for the environmental impact in question. That is, a study may 
utilise the results from another valuation study and adjust them for use in the 
present context. Economic values may also be assessed through opportunity 
costs, i.e., the net benefit of an environmental service. For example, a 
hydroelectric development of a river affects the recreational possibilities in 
the river. The opportunity cost of the development is then the forgone net 
benefits of the affected recreational activities in the river. 
To sum up, it is clear that there exists an abundance of methods and 
techniques to approach the problem of monetising external costs. These 
methods may, however, as illustrated in Table 1, only be useful under specific 
circumstances and for specific impacts. As a result one single method may 
Table 1: Relevance of Methods to Value Specific Effects 
Resource Pollution Recreation 
Degradation 
Indirect Methods: 
Productivity changes !! ! 
Income changes !! 
Avertive expenditure !! !! 
Replacement cost 
Travel cost !! 
Hedonic pricing !! !! 
Direct Methods: 
Trade-off game 
Contingent valuation ! 
Stated Preference ? ? ? 
! ! ;: Highly relevant, ! :::= Relevant, ? ::: Possibly relevant 
Source: Adapted from Binning et al. (1996). 
Natural Work Non-use 
Amenity Environment Benefits 
!! 
!! 
!! 
!! 
? ? ? 
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not permit all of the impacts to be addressed, and this necessitates the use of 
several methods in the assessment. What complicates things further is that 
the types of externalities that arise from various forms of electricity production 
also differ. Thus, since the types of externalities differ among fuels, different 
methods may have to be utilised in the monetisation of impacts for the 
variety of fuels. This is especially a problem if different methods tend to 
yield different results, thus producing environmental impact estimates that 
are incomparable with those of other methods. If this is the case, it may be 
hard to draw reliable conclusions about the ranking of different fuel sources 
in terms of external costs. 
3. A Brief Overview of Previous Electricity Externality Studies 
A considerable number of externality studies were carried out during the 
1980s and 1990s. The focus in this survey is on studies, whose aim has been 
to assess the total external costs (and in some cases benefits) per kWh of 
different electric power technologies. Some studies were therefore deemed to 
be irrelevant for the present purpose since they only covered one specific 
impact, e.g., Fankhauser (1993) which only assesses global warming impacts, 
and some were identified but could simply not be obtained (e.g., BPA 1986). 
Table 2 provides an overview of about forty externality studies covered in the 
analysis.5 An inspection of the different externality assessments laid out in 
Table 2 reveals several conceptual issues of importance, out of which five 
will be stressed here. 
First, most of the fuel sources available for power generation have been 
addressed in previous valuation efforts, including coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear, 
hydro, wind, solar, biomass, and in a few cases lignite, waste incineration, 
geothermal, peat and orimulsion. However, most studies focus on the 
traditional fuels, such as coal and nuclear. There is thus a tendency to focus 
on existing technologies rather than on the technologies generally expected 
to play a significant role in the future (i.e., wind, biomass and so on.). In 
many cases this is understandable given that empirical data clearly are more 
available for existing (rather than emerging) technologies. Nevertheless, an 
important goal of externality valuation in the power sector has been to 'level 
the playing field' in the selection between traditional and new generating 
technologies, and this would probably require a stronger focus also on 
promising but not yet commercialised technologies. 
Second, a majority of the studies have been carried out for the developed 
world (mostly for Western Europe and the USA). Thus, only in some rare 
cases the focus has been on developing countries where the need for additional 
power capacity is by far the greatest (e.g., IEA 1998). There are also reasons 
5 All monetary estimates presented in this article have been converted into US Dollars 
(1998) using mean exchange rates and the US Consumer Price Index. This process 
has not always been straightforward since the base years used in the studies are not 
always explicitly stated. Whenever this problem arose, the year of publication was 
used as a proxy for conversion and this may have lead to somewhat biased estimates. 
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Table 2: Overview of Externality Studies 
Study Country Fuel Extemality Estimate Method 
(US cents/kWh 1998) 
Schuman & Cavanagh (1982) us Coal 0.06-44.07 Abatement cost 
Nuclear 0.11-64.45 
Solar 0-0.25 
Wind 0-0.25 
Hohmeyer (1988) Germany Fossil fuels 2.37-6.53 Damage cost 
Nuclear 7.17-14.89 (top-down) 
Wind 0.18-0.36 
Solar 0.68-1.03 
Chernick & Caverhill (1989) us Coal 4.37-7.74 Abatement cost 
Oil 4.87-7.86 
Gas 1.75-2.62 
Bemow & Marron (1990); us Coal 5.57-12.45 Abatement cost 
Bemow et al. (1991) Oil 4.40-12.89 
Gas 2.10-7.98 
Hall (1990) us Nuclear 2.37-3.37 Abatement cost 
Friedrich & Kallenbach (1991); Germany Coal 0.36-0.86 Damage cost 
Friedrich & Voss (1993) Nuclear 0.03-0.56 (bottom-up) 
Wind 0.02-0.33 
Solar 0.05-1.11 
Ottinger et al. (1991) us Coal 3.62-8.86 Damage cost 
Oil 3.87-10.36 (bottom-up) 
Gas 1.00-1.62 
Nuclear 3.81 
Hydro 1.43-1.62 
Wind 0-0.12 
Solar 0-0.50 
Biomass 0-0.87 
Waste 5 
Putta (1991) us Coal 1.75 Abatement cost 
Hohmeyer (1992) Germany Fossil fuels 11.12 Damage cost 
Nuclear 7.01-48.86 (top-down) 
Wind 0.12-0.24 
Solar 0.54-0.76 
Pearce et al. (1992) UK Coal 2.67-14.43 Damage cost 
Oil 13.14 (top-down) 
Gas 1.05 
Nuclear 0.81 
Hydro 0.09 
Wind 0.09 
Solar 0.15 
Carlsen et al. ( 1993) Norway Hydro 2.68-26.26 Abatement cost 
Cifuentes & Lave (1993); us Coal 2.17-20.67 Abatement cost 
Parfomak (1997) Gas 0.03-0.04 
ORNL & RfF (1994-1998) us Coal 0.11-0.48 Damage cost 
Oil 0.04-0.32 (bottom-up) 
Gas 0.01-0.03 
Nuclear 0.02-0.12 
Hydro 0.02 
RER (1994) us Oil 0.03-5 .81 Damage cost 
Gas 0.003-0.48 (bottom-up) 
EC (1995) Germany Coal 2.39 Damage cost 
Oil 3 (bottom-up) 
Lignite 1.37 
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Table 2: continued 
Study Country Fuel Extemality Estimate Method 
(US cents/kWh 1998) 
France Nuclear 0.0003-0.01 Damage cost 
(bottom-up) 
Norway Hydro 0.32 Damage cost 
(bottom-up) 
UK Coal 0.98 Damage cost 
Gas 0.1 (bottom-up) 
Wind 0.11-0.32 
Pearce (199 5) UK Coal 3.02 Damage cost 
Gas 0.49 (top-down) 
Nuclear 0.07-0.55 
Rowe et al. (1995) us Coal 0.31 Damage cost 
Oil 0.73 (bottom-up) 
Gas 0.22 
Nuclear 0.01 
Wind 0.001 
van Horen (1996) South Africa Coal 0.90-5.01 Damage cost 
Nuclear 1.34-4.54 (bottom-up) 
Bhattacharyya (1997) India Coal 1.36 Damage cost 
(bottom-up) 
Ott (1997) Switzerland Oil 12.97-20.57 Damage cost 
Gas 8.85-13.22 (top-down) 
Nuclear 0.62-1.50 
Hydro 0.25-1.50 
Faaij et al. (1998) Netherlands Coal 3.98 Damage cost 
(top-down) 
Netherlands Coal 3.84 Damage cost 
Biomass 8.1 (bottom-up) 
EC (1999) Austria Gas 0.88 Damage cost 
Hydro 0.02 (bottom-up) 
Biomass 1.54-7.56 
Belgium Coal 3.22-67.72 Damage cost 
Gas 0.67-9.73 (bottom-up) 
Nuclear 0.02-0.79 
Denmark Gas 0.99-11.19 Damage cost 
Wind 0.08-0.51 (bottom-up) 
Biomass 2.34-12.55 
Finland Coal 1.07-18.15 Damage cost 
Biomass 0.83-2.00 (bottom-up) 
Peat 0.69-1.69 
France Coal 9.61-29.45 Damage cost 
Oil 11.79-39.93 (bottom-up) 
Gas 2.70-7.68 
Biomass 0.82-2.51 
Waste 22.17-68.73 
Greece Oil 2.07-19.89 Damage cost 
Gas 0.57-4.97 (bottom-up) 
Hydro 0.71 
Wind 0.31-0.80 
Biomass 0.14-3.43 
Lignite 3.67-36.54 
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Table 2: continued 
Study Country Fuel Extemality Estimate Method 
(US cents/kWh 1998) 
Germany Coal 2.38-23 .67 Damage cost 
Oil 5.30-35.16 (bottom-up) 
Gas 0.83-9.55 
Nuclear 0.08-1.45 
Wind 0.05-0.31 
Solar 0.08-1.69 
Biomass 3.78-13 .19 
Lignite 2.83-56.57 
Ireland Coal 6.16-31.90 Damage cost 
Peat 4.62-5.32 (bottom-up) 
Italy Oil 3.24-24.52 Damage cost 
Gas 1.21-11.78 (bottom-up) 
Hydro 0.47 
Waste 
Netherlands Coal 1.68-24.48 Damage cost 
Gas 0.43-9.65 (bottom-up) 
Nuclear 1.03 
Biomass 0.49-2.86 
Norway Gas 0.26-8.04 Damage cost 
Hydro 0.32 (bottom-up) 
Wind 0.07-0.35 
Biomass 0.33 
Portugal Coal 3.69-30.22 Damage cost 
Gas 0.28-8.74 (bottom-up) 
Hydro 0.03-0.07 
Biomass 1.53-8.52 
Spain Coal 4.64-32.60 Damage cost 
Gas 7.13-9.53 (bottom-up) 
Wind 0.24-0.34 
Biomass 2.41-22.09 
Waste 3.58-26.19 
Sweden Coal 0.84-16.93 Damage cost 
Hydro 7.83-18.54 (bottom-up) 
Biomass 0.35-0.60 
UK Coal 4.06-33 .01 Damage cost 
Oil 3.22-22.10 (bottom-up) 
Gas 0.73-10.21 
Wind 0.17-0.34 
Biomass 0.72-3.22 
Orimulsion 2.94-24.20 
Hirschberg & Jakob (1999) Switzerland Coal 4.54-23.16 Damage cost 
Oil 5.13-26.09 (bottom-up) 
Gas 1.17-8.06 
Nuclear 0.29-1.90 
Hydro 0-1.76 
Wind 0.15-0.88 
Solar 0.15-2.20 
Biomass 3.67-8.50 
Maddison (1999) UK/Germany Coal 0.31/0.71 Damage cost 
Oil 0.78 (bottom-up) 
Gas 0.13 
Lignite 0.73 
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to believe that valuation estimates should differ substantially between 
developing and developed countries. In the developing countries incomes are 
lower, and the environmental effects of power production may be 
fundamentally different. An important example of the latter is the 
environmental externalities stemming from hydropower development. For 
instance, hydroelectric development in a temperate climate may give rise to 
global warming impacts due to mouldering of vegetation left in the reservoir, 
while hydroelectric development in colder climates will not (e.g., Moreira 
and Poole 1993). This raises serious concerns about transferring environmental 
values from studies conducted in, say, Western Europe, for use in a developing 
country context. 
Third, examining the methodologies utilised over time reveals that the 
bottom-up damage cost approach seems to have become the dominant 
paradigm, while the abatement cost and top-down approaches were 
predominantly used in the 1980s and early 1990s (Figure 7). An important 
reason for this development is that the national implementation phase of the 
ExternE project (EC 1999), relies solely on damage cost bottom-up models, 
and these studies together represent a large share of the total number of 
projects conducted during the latter part of the 1990s. This also indicates, 
however, that the bottom-up model has been accepted as the most appropriate 
method with which to assess power generation externalities. The ExtemE 
project has largely served as a vehicle in the methodological development of 
externality valuation. The scientific quality of the ExtemE work as well as 
the methodologies used has been well accepted at the international level, and 
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Figure 7: Methodological Choice Over Time 
Source: Sundqvist (2000). 
The Journal of Energy Literature VIII. 2 2002 19 
many followers rely heavily on the numbers and the methods presented 
(Krewitt 2002). However, this development raises the question of whether 
the choice of methodological approach (between abatement costs and damage 
costs) matters for the results. In section 4 we revert to this question in more 
detail and suggest that this choice very well may matter, which in tum raises 
important concerns about the reliability of external cost valuation exercises 
in the power-generating sector. 
Fourth, as can be seen in Figure 8 the disparity of external cost estimates 
is considerable when compared across different studies (note the use of 
logarithmic scale). Figure 8 is based on the results from 63 extemality studies6 
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Figure 8: Range of External Cost Estimates 
Sources: Table 2 and Sundqvist (2000). 
6 These include those outlined in Table 2 and a number of additional studies that are 
not presented here in detail (see, however, Sundqvist 2000) . Most of the latter 
observations build on secondary sources in which the details (i.e., methodology, 
scope etc.) of the studies are not reported. 
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and the numbers in 'square-brackets' show the total number of observations 
for each fuel source. The ranges also intertwine making the ranking of various 
fuels with respect to externality impacts a difficult task. Still, some tentative 
conclusions can be drawn. For instance, the results suggest that fossil fuel-
fired power, in particular coal and oil, gives rise to the highest external costs, 
while some of the renewable energy sources, solar, wind and also hydropower, 
tend to have the lowest. 
It is, however, also of interest to note that biomass-based electric power 
appears to incur substantially higher external costs than the other renewable 
energy alternatives.7 This notion, if valid, questions some of the recent policy 
initiatives that attempt at encouraging the use of renewable energy per se, 
i.e., without distinguishing between the different renewables, through green 
certificates and competitive bidding systems. 
For a specific fuel source the difference between low and high values is 
substantial and this is also true if one looks at single studies; the ranges 
reported can often vary from a tiny fraction of electricity market prices and 
the private costs of producing power to a number that is way above private 
cost levels. Looking at, for example, coal and oil the range of results produced 
by recent studies is from 0.004 to roughly 68 US cents per kWh for coal and 
from 0.03 to almost 40 US cents per kWh for oil (Table 3). In comparison, 
the projected lifetime generation costs for the cheapest new power plants 
(coal and natural gas) normally range between 2.5 and 7 US cents per kWh 
depending on country and site (IEA/NEA 1998). The reported discrepancies 
in results for similar fuels raise some concerns about the validity and reliability 
of the conducted valuation studies. Still, it must be made clear that there is 
no reason to question the general notion that to some extent the numbers 
should differ due to, for instance: (a) the use of different technologies (e.g., 
implying separate emission factors); (b) the characteristics of the specific site 
under consideration (e.g., population density, income, transport distances and 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Previous Extemality Studies 
(US Cents/kWh) Coal Oil Gas Nuclear Hydro Wind Solar Biomass 
Min 0.004 0.03 0.003 0.0003 0 0 0 0 
Max 67.72 39.93 13.22 64.45 26.26 0.88 2.20 22.09 
Difference 16930% 1331% 441% 214833% 
Mean 14.01 12.32 4.61 7.12 3.36 0.31 0.84 4.95 
Median 6.38 9.11 2.62 0.81 0.32 0.32 0.76 2.68 
Std. Dev. 15.99 12.45 4.58 16.96 7.59 0.24 0.74 5.57 
N 36 20 31 21 16 18 11 22 
Source: See Table 2. 
7 Sundqvist (2002) shows that these tentative conclusions remain after having accounted 
for methodological choice, income, ·and whether the entire fuel cycle (rather than 
only the generation stage) has been evaluated. 
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so on.); and (c) differences in scope (e.g., a fraction of all externalities may 
be included, and/or the entire fuel cycle rather than only the generation stage 
has been evaluated). Overall, however, the question of whether the large 
ranges in estimates are motivated or not, is difficult to determine, especially 
since there exists no objective truth with which to confront the empirical 
estimates. 
Fifth and finally, Table 2 and Figure 8 do not display the different types 
of externalities covered, but a closer examination of this also reveals important 
disparities among studies. For example, Table 4 lists eight studies that have 
assessed the impacts of hydropower. It is apparent that the types and the 
classification of impacts differ among studies (Sundqvist 2000), e.g., some of 
the hydropower studies have left out the 'typical' recreational impacts. 
Table 4: Impacts Monetised in Eight Hydropower Studies 
Study Impacts Study Impacts 
Ottinger et al. (1991) Forest Martins et al. Health 
Wildlife in EC (1999) Agriculture 
Recreation Crops 
Fur trapping 
Pearce et al . (1992) Health Nilsson & Gullberg Ecological 
Global warming in EC (1999) Social 
Carlsen et al. (1993) Regional economic Diakoulaki et al. Health 
Nature conservation in EC (1999) Forest 
Forest Agriculture 
Recreation Noise 
Fish Water 
Reindeer herding Biodiversity 
Employment 
EC (1995) Health ORNL & RfF (1994) Recreation 
Forest Employment 
Agriculture 
Water supply 
Recreation 
Cultural sites 
Ecosystems 
Employment 
Ferry traffic 
Local income 
There are also important differences among the various studies with 
respect to the number of stages of the entire fuel cycle assessed. For instance, 
all the hydropower studies assess solely the construction and generation stage. 
For coal, on the other hand, a large part focuses on several stages of the fuel 
cycle (Table 5). This also raises the question of what are the relevant scope 
and the appropriate externality classifications to use in these types of studies. 
Krewitt (2002) concludes in his evaluation of the ExternE project that it has 
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Table 5: Fuel Cycle Stages Monetised in Eight Coal Studies 
Study 
Schuman & Cavanagh (1982) 
Chernick & Caverhill (1989) 
Ottinger et al. (1991) 
Pearce et al. ( 1992) 
ORNL & RfF (1994) 
EC (1995) 
Krewitt et al. in EC (1999) 
Linares et al. in EC (1999) 
Stages 
Generation 
Generation 
Generation 
Generation 
Extraction 
Transport 
Generation 
Construction 
Mining 
Fuel processing 
Transport 
Generation 
Decommissioning 
Extraction 
Transport 
Generation 
Construction 
Extraction 
Transport 
Cleaning 
Generation 
Waste disposal 
provided some partial answers to this question but that many important issues 
remain unsolved. 
To sum up, this section has provided a rough and aggregate overview of 
previous attempts to place value on the external costs of electricity. In section 
4 we take a closer look at the studies under review and identify some 
conceptual issues that need to be addressed before the usefulness and the 
reliability of externality studies can be assessed. 
4. Fundamental Questions about the Valuation of Electricity 
Externalities 
As was noted in the introduction to this article most of the previous surveys 
of electricity externality studies focus on selected technical and method-
ological issues that need to be resolved before the valuation exercises can 
provide reliable estimates of energy externalities. For instance, the appropriate 
ways of finding reliable estimates of C02 and mortality impacts have been 
discussed intensively (e.g., Freeman 1996; Krewitt 2002). In this section, 
however, a number of more fundamental issues concerning non-market 
valuation of energy externalities are discussed. In particular we discuss the 
role of externality valuation in policy-making, and in particular the issue of 
whether the specific theoretical foundations of economic valuation methods 
represent a problem when these methods are used in practice. 
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What Constitutes an Externality? 
As was noted above, the welfare economics literature provides a relatively 
straightforward definition of the concept of externality (e.g., Baumol and 
Oates 1988). However, in practice the choice of 'relevant' externalities tends 
to differ between different valuation studies. In other words, some studies 
seem to differ considerably in their definition of what constitutes an 
externality. Two important examples will help to illustrate this point. 
First, there is some disagreement on whether the consumption of non-
renewable natural resources, such as fossil fuels and uranium, leads to external 
costs. Hohmeyer (1988) adds a resource depletion charge and an external 
cost to public investment in R&D in his study. According to his lower estimate, 
these two components together account for more than 80 per cent of the 
external costs of the nuclear fuel cycle. The classification of natural resource 
depletion as an externality is, however, questionable. Hohmeyer (as well as 
others) relies on the concept of 'backstop-technology' in the development of 
external costs for depletion impacts. This concept is based on the notion that 
the price for a given non-renewable resource will increase over time as the 
resource becomes scarcer in line with the so-called Hotelling rule (Hotelling 
1931 ), but only up to the point where a substitute (backstop) technology 
becomes more attractive (e.g., the use of renewable resources). However, 
historical data indicate that the real prices for non-renewables have, due to 
technological developments, material substitution and exploration, fallen over 
time, something which is in direct contrast to the path predicted by the 
Hotelling rule (e.g., Radetzki 2002). Thus, for most natural resources the 
empirical data suggest decreasing (rather than increasing) scarcity and that 
the backstop-technology is not likely to ever become economically viable. 
Furthermore, in discussing the taxation of non-renewable resources as a way 
of internalising externalities, Maler (1997) concludes that most tax regimes 
will only have distorting effects on the use of non-renewable resources, and 
that markets will often do at least as good a job of solving resource scarcity 
problems if left to their own. 
Second, the inclusion of employment benefits (following a power 
generation investment) as an external benefit also strains the definition of 
what an externality is. In a paper on non-environmental externalities Bohi 
(1993:14) concludes: 
[ . . . ] the existence of a breakdown in the local labor market is required to establish the 
existence of an externality, where for some reason unemployed labor will not migrate 
to other areas to gain employment, and will remain unemployed unless there is an 
increase in local job opportunities. 
Consequently, for employment effects to be considered 'external' the local 
and regional labour market must function poorly (i.e., market failures must 
be present) and workers must be immobile. Other authors, however, make a 
strong case for treating employment impacts as external benefits (e.g., ORNL 
and RfF 1994). For instance, to the extent that people obtain disutility (e.g., 
less self-confidence) from unemployment as such, this notion is valid. 
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However, in such a case the employment benefits should be compared across 
all fuel sources, and not only for renewable energy projects as is often the 
case. 
A related question to that of externality definitions is whether one should 
credit the avoided external costs from replacing existing power generation as 
major benefits of 'new' investments in, say, wind, solar or biomass (see, for 
instance, Hohmeyer 1988). These avoided costs do not per se constitute 
externalities. Including these 'avoided' externalities of fossil fuels, as Lee 
(1997) notes, also gives rise to double counting of externalities for these fuel 
sources (i.e., an external cost for fossil fuels and an external benefit for the 
renewables). In addition, · some studies include subsidies to the power 
generation sector as a negative externality (e.g., van Horen (1996) in the case 
of nuclear in South Africa) . However, subsidies as such do not constitute 
externalities. 
In sum, it must be noted that some studies - of which two have just been 
mentioned - attempt to accomplish something more than a valuation of the 
externalities per se. If the specific aim of a study, such as Hohmeyer's (1988), 
is to evaluate the benefits and costs of replacing existing power sources with 
new ones, it will be correct to include the avoided costs from replacing 
existing power sources. Similarly, van Horen's study (de facto) represents a 
first step towards assessing the total (internal and external) costs of power 
production (by assuming that the existing subsidies to nuclear power are not 
motivated from an economic efficiency point of view). However, both of the 
above analyses constitute broader research undertakings, and they must 
therefore not be confused with pure externality valuation studies. 
For economists the existence of externalities motivates regulatory action 
and the use of taxes and subsidies to improve efficiency. However, often lay 
people and politicians hold the view that regulations and other policy measures 
should be used to promote the 'good' and discourage the 'bad' in a much 
broader sense. This suggests that economists have to be careful in explaining 
what the results stemming from externality appraisals show and what they do 
not show. The above also raises the more philosophical question of what 
should be the ultimate end of policy: economic efficiency based on individual 
preferences or other value judgments formed in public deliberations (or any 
mix of these policy principles)? If the latter path is chosen, externality 
valuation may still provide an important input into the policy decision process 
but the notion of some 'total' (or 'true') cost of electricity production appear 
less valid. We will revert to this question below. 
What is the Relevant Scope of the Analysis? 
Even though all the external costs and benefits of a given power generation 
source have been identified, there remains the issue of choosing the 
appropriate level of scope of the valuation effort. At least two choices have 
to be made. Which of the externalities are important enough to include in the 
valuation, and should the study address externalities across the entire fuel 
cycle (including downstream and upstream impacts) or only focus on the 
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generation stage? We have seen (in section 3) that the studies conducted in 
the past have made different choices in these respects, and this is likely to 
explain some of the disparity in the estimates presented. For instance, by 
using a statistical analysis Sundqvist (2002) shows that the expected 
extemality estimates of the studies focusing on the entire fuel cycle are 
higher, ceteris paribus, than those presented in generation-only studies. 
Sundqvist also tested for the impact of including or excluding C02-estimates; 
the outcome of this exercise indicated that whether C02 was assessed or not 
significantly affects externality estimates. Results such as these beg the 
question as to what is the relevant scope of an externality investigation. Let 
us first look at how this question has been dealt with in previous studies. 
As a part of the process of deciding what externalities to include, many 
of the studies reviewed in this article (e.g., Rowe et al. 1995; ORNL and RfF 
1994-1998; EC 1995; 1999) begin with a comprehensive screening of the 
relevant economic and scientific literature to determine which pathways and 
end points are likely to be important in the analysis. Thus, some of the 
externalities are de facto assigned a zero value on the basis of their presumed 
insignificance, while others are included in the analysis since the initial 
screening could not rule out the possibility of significant effects. It should be 
clear that this approach may lead to total externality values that are 
significantly downward biased.8 What is perhaps of more importance, 
however, is those cases where externalities are left out of the analysis because 
there is insufficient scientific information to establish defensible monetary 
damage values. The most important example is global warming and C02 
emissions (e.g., Freeman 1996). In the first phase of the ExtemE project it 
was noted that the environmental damage cost estimates for greenhouse gas 
emissions presented in the literature spanned a range of several orders of 
magnitude (EC 1995), and the main report concluded that: '[ ... ] all attempts 
to value these impacts require important normative judgements, and therefore 
the potential for synthesis or consensus is remote'. 
After additional research efforts within the ExternE project (EC 1999) 
these general conclusions largely appear to be still valid (Krewitt 2002). It is, 
however, generally agreed that the external costs of co2 emissions are 
substantial and may therefore constitute a large share of the total value 
(Freeman and Rowe 1995). The environmental economist faces a dilemma 
here; is it better to leave out potentially important external damages from the 
valuation and present biased estimates or should one make use of rough 
proxy estimates (e.g., mitigation costs) so as to provide (or at least approach) 
some kind of 'full cost' estimate? The ExternE study (EC 1999) in the end 
chose the latter path and recommended the use of 'minimum, 'central' and 
'maximum' estimates (see below). 
This raises a number of important issues, though. The choice of what 
externalities to include in the assessment cannot be done entirely objectively 
8 Even if the value of each externality is deemed to be low, the total value of a large 
number of 'insignificant' values could be substantial. In some studies up to about 100 
effects are classified as negligible (Ottinger 1997). 
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but is largely a matter of judgment. The judgment that has to be made is 
essentially whether, for instance, an environmental impact under consideration 
is 'mature' enough to 'undergo' economic valuation. This is however not 
only a question of whether the scientific knowledge is more or less established; 
it also involves the issue of whether the public is sufficiently informed and, 
hence, able to form an opinion of their own about the issue at hand. Again, 
economic valuation is ultimately about measuring people's given preferences 
towards goods, but if no relevant preference structure for a particular good, 
such as global warming, exists, the valuation effort may become arbitrary. 
We have also noted above that the use of abatement cost estimates (i.e., 
regulatory revealed preferences) provides poor substitutes since such estimates 
rely on the notion that all relevant preferences have already been perfectly 
integrated into policy decisions. 
This questions ExternE's choice to present rough estimates of the global 
warming impacts. Moreover, global warming also entails important ethical 
and justice-related issues such as the question of whether human lives lost in 
developing countries should count less than corresponding lives in the 
developed world,9 or to what extent impacts affecting future generations 
should be discounted or not (e.g., Azar and Sterner 1996). In such a case, 
therefore, the initial challenge of policy may not lie in 'measuring' and 
aggregating individual preferences but in specifying the conditions for public 
discourse over common ways of understanding what the pertinent issues are 
about (see also below).10 
The above also suggests that any notion of 'full, 'total' or 'true' cost of 
electricity has to be understood as at best hypothetical. The fact that extemality 
studies leave out potentially important externalities may not be a problem 
per se. On the contrary, non-market valuation builds on specific basic 
assumptions, primarily about the behaviour and preferences of the public, 
and if these are not well articulated it may be better to refrain from monetary 
valuation. These concerns are likely to be particularly valid for 'goods' with 
which people have relatively little past experience, and which are 'complex' 
and involve far-reaching and unknown consequences (Vatn and Bromley 
1994 ). Global warming as well as the risk profile of nuclear accidents and 
radioactive waste provide two such examples. 
Finally, the choice of what parts of the fuel cycle to focus on also 
complicates the assessment of the 'full' cost of electricity. Where should one 
draw the appropriate analytical boundaries, and thus the limits of the external 
cost assessment? This choice is perhaps somewhat more technical than that 
about what externalities to include, but it is no less important. It is also 
9 This is normally an outcome of the fact that global warming impacts are valued at 
national or regional prices. 
10 One may of course argue that even if people have less developed preferences towards 
global warming as such they may still be able to express their willingness to pay to 
avoid the consequences of global warming (which may be easier to comprehend than 
its causes) . Still, this notion disregards the fact that people's preferences towards 
these consequences and their view on the ethical issues involved are likely to be 
dependent on the causes of these same effects. 
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complicated by the fact that the values of many upstream and downstream 
impacts tend to be highly site-specific and depend, for instance, on the mode 
of transportation and the location of the place where the fuel is extracted 
(Freeman 1996). One problem is how one is to choose to define the 'entire' 
fuel supply chain. For instance, if we include the externalities incurred by 
transporting fuels from the mine or well to the power station in the analysis, 
should we then not also include the corresponding transport-related 
externalities involved in bringing building materials and workers to the power 
plant construction site? The choice of a relevant level of analysis is not easy, 
and this also suggests that the notion of any 'total' or 'true' cost of power 
generation is flawed. Ideally this choice should be guided by the need for 
relevant policy information. 
What are the Relevant Parameter Input Assumptions? 
There are essentially two different categories of parameter input assumptions 
made in electricity externality studies; technical assumptions (e.g., energy 
efficiency, dose-response functions, emission factors), and economic 
assumptions (i.e., monetary values, discount rates). Previous survey work in 
the field has spent a lot of time on these issues (e.g., Lee 1997; Schleisner 
2000). However, while past discussions have normally focused on what are 
the 'best' estimates (assumptions) to make, we will focus in more detail on 
the role of the above assumptions in explaining the wide disparity of 
extemality estimates (Figure 8) and for providing relevant policy implications. 
Table 6 shows the assumed emission levels in tons per kWh for some air 
pollutants in some selected externality studies. These differ significantly across 
studies. 11 The reported emission levels, as Lee (1997) also notes, are greater 
in the earlier studies (late 1980s and early 1990s) which also produced higher 
estimated damages than the studies from the mid 1990s. One important reason 
for this is that two of the early studies include global warming. The ExtemE 
national implementation studies (EC 1999) also report global warming impacts 
and thus present estimates that are generally above the levels of the earlier 
studies. However, the monetary values incurred for the C02 impacts span 
over a wide range. On average the values range from a low of 0.55 to a high 
of 12.48 US cents per kWh, with discounted mid-point estimates of 1.73 (3 
per cent discount rate) and 4.32 (1 per cent discount rate) US cents per kWh, 
thus significantly affecting the totals (see Ki.ihn (1998) for more on this 
issue). Overall this shows the importance of input assumptions and hence of 
the input-data used in the studies. 
Another example concerns the assumptions made about the monetary 
11 The assumptions about emission intensities are often based on actual observations 
that in turn are affected by existing legislation. However, the 'level of legislation' 
differs considerably among countries. As a result, there is a considerable potential for 
error here; in the countries with strict regulations a considerable part of damages 
may already be internalised, while in countries with more lax regulations only a 
fraction of the total damages may be internalised. Thus, the comparison of studies 
across countries and hence among varying levels of regulations may be rather complex. 
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Table 6: Assumed Emission Levels for Coal: Power Generation Stage 
Pollutant 
(tons/kWh) 
Hohme:yer 
(1988) 
8.33 
3.84 
excluded 
Ottinger 
et al. (1991) 
9 
3.04 
1050 
Pearce et al. ORNL & RfF EC EC 
(1992)" (1994-1998) b (1995)< (1999)d 
1.32 & 15.4 1.74 & 0.81 1.21 & 0.88 1.18 & 1.36 
2.98 & 5.84 2.9 & 2.2 2.43 & 0.88 1.70 & 2.22 
1200 & 1420 excluded excluded 1015 & 900 
External Cost 2.37-6.53 3.62-8.86 2.67-14.43 0.11--0.48 0.98-2.39 4.64--32.22 
(US cents/kWh) 
Notes; 
a: estimates for new and old plant 
b: estimates for US South West and US South East 
c: estimates for West Burton (UK) and Lauffen (Germany) 
d: estimates for Spain and France 
values used to value mortality impacts. Many previous studies use the value 
of a statistical life (VOSL) and the assumptions made concerning this value 
tend to differ. For example, the ExternE core study (EC 1995) uses a VOSL-
value of 2.6 million USD for Europe while van Horen (1996) relies on a 
value range of 2.9-5.6 million USD for (the poorer country) South Africa. 
In the national implementation part of the ExternE project (EC 1999) the 
decision was made to introduce an alternative measure on which to base the 
valuation of mortality impacts due to air pollution. This is the so-called Years 
of Life Lost (YOLL) approach, which essentially assigns a WTP to the risk 
of reducing life expectancy rather than to the risk of death (ibid.). The YOLL-
values attributed to the mortality impacts are, as is evident from Figure 9, 
reduced by up to two orders of magnitude as compared to the values based 
on the VOSL-method (see also Kuhn 1998). In addition, the core project (EC 
1995) that relied on the VOSL-approach did not include values for chronic 
mortality impacts due to air pollution, something that the national 
implementation studies do. 
Overall, the above implies very different messages to the policy makers 
about mortality impacts depending on method used and the scope of the 
investigation. Schleisner (2000), who compares the ExternE core project (EC 
1995) and the Rowe et al. (1995) study, supports the view that the assumptions 
underlying the valuation of human health and mortality impacts as well as 
dose-response functions are major drivers of external cost estimates. Clearly 
this also provides a major explanation as to why the total externality estimates 
from different studies often differ much (even for the same fuel source). 
So far in this sub-section we have noted that the input assumptions made 
in externality assessments play a significant role in affecting the overall 
external damage estimates, and thus in guiding policy. To some extent this is 
of course how it should be; different sites and different technologies 
(depending, for instance, on vintage) incur various emission impacts and 
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Figure 9: External Cost Estimates in the ExtemE Core and National Implementation 
Projects: Coal (C) and Oil (0) Fuel Cycle 
Sources: EC (1995; 1999). 
hence damages. 12 Still, the large sensitivity in results due to parameter input 
assumptions also creates problems for policy makers. First, pplicy makers 
often wish to gain some notion as to which are the most important 
environmental damages for each power generation source. This enables them 
to target policy measures, such as subsidies, R&D support, and regulations, 
towards the most important impacts. However, previous research efforts have 
only provided some limited guidance on this particular point. As has also 
been noted by OTA (1994 ), in many studies a single category of damages 
seems to dominate the total external cost estimates. For example, in 
Hohmeyer's (1988) study and the initial ExternE coal stUdy (EC 1995) human-
health related impacts dominate the aggregate damage (75 per cent and 76-
95 per cent of the total, respectively), but for van Horen (1996) C02 impacts 
constitute the majority of estimated damages from the coal fuel cycle (80-90 
percent). Second, in deregulated electricity markets one of the most important 
uses of external cost estimates is as inputs in the development of 
environmental taxes and tradable permit schemes (Freeman 1996). For this 
reason, though, policy makers would need relatively 'safe bets' about the 
general impacts involved, but so far previous studies have provided only 
12 This puts in doubt those studies that rely heavily on so-called benefit transfers, and 
thus draw on the original research of others without making necessary modifications. 
For instance, in valuing the external damages caused by air pollutants from coal 
generation in South Africa van Horen ( 1996) employs the dose-response relationships 
developed within the New Ym:c State Environmental Extemality Costing Study (Rowe 
et al., 1995), but is unable to fully adjust the model to South African conditions. 
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wide ranges of estimates. Again, the impact of global warming is a good 
illustration of this. 
This discussion raises a fundamental issue in non-market valuation that 
is rarely touched upon in the electricity externality debate. Most environmental 
economists would agree that environmental valuation requires that a relevant 
'project' has been defined, and that involves the choice between two or more 
relevant alternatives (Brannlund and Kristrom 1998). In the case of electricity 
externalities these 'projects' are normally the investments in different power 
plants (few companies or governments undertake investments in entire fuel 
cycles). However, in externality studies these investment projects are often 
hypothetical, i.e., they do not represent an existing (real) situation, and 
valuation estimates are therefore transferred from other studies. The problem 
with this is that according to the literature on non-market valuation (and 
indeed that on mark;et valuation as well) economic values are context 
dependent and project-specific (e.g., Garrod and Willis 1999). In other words, 
it may not make much sense to talk about a universal WTP for avoiding one 
ton of so2 being emitted, even though that is just what many policy makers 
would like to know about as they often prefer more or less harmonised 
standards and taxes across different regions. 
Does the Choice of Methodological Approach Matter? 
As has been noted above, there is no reason to question the fact that external 
cost estimates vary considerably across different studies if there exist rational 
reasons for this discrepancy. One important example, though, where one 
would be concerned about the reported disparity is if the choice of 
methodology has a significant impact on the results. In section 2 we 
emphasised that there is a vast number of different valuation methods (Figure 
6), but in this section we will focus solely on the broader approaches to 
externality valuation: abatement costs, top-down damage costs, and bottom-
up damage costs. Let us first consider what lessons can be drawn from 
previous studies about the difference between abatement costs and (bottom-
up) damage costs 
Few studies analyse this difference, but Table 7 presents some empirical 
evidence of environmental cost estimates conducted by the California Energy 
Commission for various air pollutants and districts in California (CBC 1993). 
This study applies both abatement cost and damage cost methods on the 
same cases making direct comparison possible. Even if the estimates vary as 
a function of district-specific conditions, it is clear that (except for PM in 
some of the districts) the abatement cost method tends to generate significantly 
higher environmental cost estimates than those developed using the damage 
cost approach. 
Joskow (1992) provides one important explanation for this phenomenon. 
Abatement costs will (theoretically) be representative of damage costs if and 
only if they are derived from the least cost strategy, but normally most 
studies employ the most commonly used (or mandated) abatement technology 
when assessing pollution abatement costs. For example, in deriving the 
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Table 7: Value of Air Emission Reductions in California 
District: South Coast Ventura County Bay Area San Diego 
(USD!Pound) 
Method: DC AC DC AC DC AC DC AC 
so 4.88 13.02 0.99 4.08 2.28 5.85 1.76 2.37 
. NO 9.52 17.4 1.08 10.85 4.83 6.84 3.66 12.03 
. 
co 0.00 6.12 0.00 I 0.00 1.45 0.00 0.72 
ROG 4.55 12.43 0.18 13.88 0.07 6.71 0.07 11 .51 
PM 31.32 3.75 16.05 1.18 15.78 1.71 9.35 0.66 
District: 
(USD/Pound) 
San Joaquin 
Valley 
Sacramento North Coast 
Method: 
so. 
NO 
co' 
ROG 
PM 
DC 
0.99 
4.26 
0.00 
2.45 
2.47 
AC 
11.71 
5.98 
2.10 
5.98 
3.42 
Valley 
DC 
0.99 
4.01 
0.00 
2.72 
1.44 
AC DC AC 
5.39 0.99 1.98 
6.01 0.53 3.96 
3.30 0.00 I 
6.01 0.31 2.31 
1.85 0.37 0.59 
Where: DC: Damage Cost, AC: Abatement Cost, I: Internalized, SO : Sulfur Oxide, 
NO.: Nitrogen Oxide, CO: Carbon Monoxide, ROG: Reacti~e Organic Gases, 
and PM: Particulate Matter. 
Source: CEC (1993). 
external damages from S02 emissions in the USA Bemow et al. (1991) make 
use of the costs for installing scrubbing equipment. At the time when this 
study was conducted this indicated a cost per ton of S02 of about USD 1500-
2000, and this estimate corresponded fairly well to the projected prices of 
future so2 emission allowances in the tradable perrhit system soon to be 
implemented in the USA. However, the actual prices of S02 allowances for 
most of the period 1992-1997 varied between USD 100 and USD 200 per 
ton (Schmalensee et al. 1998), indicating that the compliance costs have been 
much lower than originally expected. As noted by Smith et al. (1998:23): 
[E]stimates in the range of [USD] 1000 per ton or more have always been for the 
marginal costs, i.e., costs associated with the most difficult-to-control sources. That 
narrow focus overlooks the flexibility made possible through emissions trading. 
In practice, many of the US coal-fired plants chose to rely on low-sulphur 
coal in their production rather than to invest in scrubbers. Technical progress 
in the abatement technology field also contributed to lower sulphur prices. 
Thus, the failure of previous studies to identify the least cost abatement 
technologies or strategies tends to lead to an exaggeration of the damage 
costs involved. Even more importantly, with technical change and increased 
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flexibility the abatement cost approach indicates a decreasing valuation of 
the environment even though, for all practical reasons, the opposite is true. 
By using the results from over forty electricity externality studies across 
eight fuel sources Sundqvist (2002) provides some econometric evidence in 
support of the conclusion that methodological choice matters for the results. 
He reports that the probability of obtaining a 'low' externality value is, 
ceteris paribus, generally lower when the abatement cost approach or the 
top-down damage cost approach are used while the opposite is true for the 
bottom-up damage cost approach. The reason why the top-down approach 
also tends to produce relatively high external damage is that there may arise 
practical problems in attributing the 'exact' damage to each individual source, 
which may force researchers to rationalise and use standardised rules for the 
attribution-process. The'se rules may fail to ascribe the aggregate damage to 
each and every individual source, especially smaller sources, thus producing 
estimates for specific power plants that are positively biased since these 
plants, normally, are easily identifiable as well as significant sources of 
pollution. 
The fundamental question raised by these results is whether the three 
broad approaches to externality valuation are at all comparable. So far we 
have suggested that the differences reported may be primarily due to purely 
practical or technical reasons such as identifying the least cost control strategy 
and/or addressing all relevant end points. If these issues can be resolved, 
thus, the methods would (at least theoretically) generate similar results. In 
the remainder of this article, however, we suggest that this is not necessarily 
the case. The reason for this has to do with the fact that people tend to have 
more than one preference ordering, something which is in contrast to the 
standard behavioural assumptions made in the economics literature (e.g., 
Nyborg 2000). Before proceeding, however, we approach the question of 
whether establishing a market for 'green' electricity can make externality 
studies redundant for policy purposes. 
Can Consumer Demand for Green Electricity Make Environmental 
Valuation Redundant? 
The assessment of environmental externalities in the power sector is motivated 
by perceived market failures , i.e., the socially optimal level of 'green' power 
is arguably higher than the level chosen by private investors. However, if 
consumers are willing to pay a premium for 'green power' and act accordingly 
in the electricity market, such 'green' preferences would, some proponents 
argue (e.g., US-DOE 1999; Global Green USA 2002; SNF 2002; Vattenfall 
2002), induce the industry to approach the optimal level of environmentally 
benign power sources. Ideally externality assessments could become redundant 
and there would be no need for additional regulatory measures to correct for 
market failures. 
However, there are several problems with this approach (Brennan 2001). 
First, a higher demand for 'green' power may be interpreted as a change in 
preferences in favour of 'green' power sour~es, but since economists evaluate 
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policy efficiency based on exogenously given preferences the very idea of 
preference change questions the foundations of economic policy analysis. In 
practice, of course, it is difficult to distinguish between activities that change 
people's preferences and those that change behaviour by altering the available 
information. Brennan (2001 :7) points out that: 
In the case of green power, the blurry distinction would be between activities that 
increase one's underlying preference for environmental protection and those that give 
consumers information to act on environmental preferences they already have. 
Second, even if we would be able to distinguish between changes in behaviour 
due to (a) preference change and (b) new information, none of these 
alternatives tend to support the conclusion that 'green' demand can replace 
externality assessments. If consumers increase their demand for 'green' power 
due to changing preferences the electricity production will still involve a 
market failure; the increase in 'green' power demand simply implies that the 
optimal level of 'green power' has increased but there will still exist a 
difference between the optimal and the actual level of 'green' power capacity. 
Thus, the need for standard regulatory measures and thus for externality 
assessments remains. Even the very idea of green preferences as policy 
substitutes creates a problem as it begs the question of how one would define 
the no-policy alternative (i.e., the one corresponding to the free market solution 
in the welfare economics literature). Brennan (2001:16-17) concludes: 
The lesson from the above is that adding preference change to the policymakers' 
toolkit creates a huge range of ambiguities for the economist's appraisal of policy 
effectiveness. This should not be surprising; to expect otherwise would be to expect 
that preferences could be both policy instrument and policy criterion [see section 2] , 
i.e., both the means and the end of policy. 
If demand for 'green' power in the past has been suppressed due to information 
failures we are essentially dealing with two types of market failures: an 
environmental externality and incomplete information. If information becomes 
(in any sense) complete, principally the environmental externality problem 
would still be there even though the total environmental impacts may be less 
severe. Also in this case 'green' power demand would not be able to replace 
externality assessments. 
Still, 'green' electricity demand could make sense from a regulatory 
point of view if the policy goals are defined, not by the economic efficiency 
criterion outlined above, but instead are based on deliberations about the 
public good in which preferences are formed rather than considered as given 
(or, less favourably, by politicians' self-interests). However, even though one 
accepts the view that green preferences can serve as a substitute for taxes, 
regulations and so on, there would still be a need for environmental valuation 
exercises. For instance, companies who wish to market their electricity as 
'green' need to understand how people perceive and value different aspects 
of their power generation portfolio. Valuation studies would provide important 
implications in that they indicate the willingness to pay for 'green' electricity 
in general, and the extent to which households and/or other customers are 
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willing to pay more for certain characteristics of the 'green' power sources 
than for others. 13 
Moreover, even though one accepts the notion that 'green' preferences 
can serve as a legitimate policy instrument one may doubt whether they are 
sufficiently developed to make a real difference. According to the economics 
literature public goods, i.e., goods characterised by non-rivalry and non-
excludability in consumption, are normally underprovided in the market place 
(e.g., Varian 1992). Since many environmental goods are essentially public in 
this sense, 'green' power markets may not promote enough of the 
environmental benefits embodied in the cleaner power technologies. This 
conclusion, however, builds on the assumption that people's preferences are 
entirely based upon utility maximising behaviour and that they are unlikely 
to express altruistic concerns. In the next section we discuss the possibility 
that people may have multiple preference orderings (and hence additional 
ethical codes), and the consequences for the social choice between power 
generation sources. 
Preferences Matter but which Preferences? 
Critics of environmental valuation based on economic methods normally 
stress that the methods used rely on overly restrictive assumptions, something 
which implies that they often produce poor descriptions of the environmental 
values people actually hold as well as of the process of preference formation 
(e.g., Spash 1997; 2000). Specifically, extemality valuations rely on the notion 
that individuals aim at maximising personal utility and that they possess well 
articulated, ethically unchallengable, and exogenous preferences for any 
environmental goods. However, environmental values often have a broad 
ethical content, and since ethics are a matter for argument environmental 
valuation should, it is argued, be endogenous to the political process and rely 
on social agreements (e.g., Jacobs 1997). In other words, the initial challenge 
of environmental policy may not lie in 'discovering' private preferences but 
in specifying the conditions for public discourse over what is worth valuing 
and for what reason. 
Sagoff (1988) claims that individuals essentially have at least two different 
preference orderings. Their private preferences reflect only their own well-
being as consumers of private goods, while the public preferences reflect 
moral values about what persons, as citizens, believe is right and just for 
society as a whole. In their roles as citizens, people may express a rights-
based (or a deontological) belief system, which denies the principle of 
utilitarianism (and tradeoffs) and instead recognises the priority of the right 
over the good (Spash 1997). Such a moral position is likely to be particularly 
prevalent in the case of environmental goods. The environment is often the 
subject of ethical concern, and it involves many cross-cutting dimensions 
13 Such studies would imply a greater reliance on choice experiment applications, since 
they encourage people to consider different attributes of a good (e.g., green 
hydropower) rather than changes in the good as a whole (e.g., Hanley et al. 1998). 
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which cannot be causally separated. In this way the 'market analogy' and the 
'commodity fiction' of environmental valuation may break down (Vatn 2000). 
There exists empirical evidence that people express public, rather than 
private, preferences when considering complex environmental issues and when 
confronted with WTP questions in contingent valuation surveys (e.g., Russell 
et al. 2001). It is also the case that the consumer-citizen distinction provides 
one explanation to some puzzling phenomena frequently observed in CVM 
studies. For example, as noted above, a large number of studies have found 
very large discrepancies between WTP and WTA measures for environmental 
goods, the latter often being several times larger than the former. This may 
be explained by the notion that in the WTA case, if the environmental good 
is morally considerable, then the acceptable level of compensation will be 
extremely high or even undefined. 
Soderholm and Sundqvist (2000a; 2000b) show that the distinction 
between private and public preferences is highly relevant when considering 
the environmental costs of power generation. Most importantly, many power 
generation externalities are either 'new' (e.g., the risk profiles of nuclear 
power) or 'complex' (e.g., ecosystem changes due to hydropower develop-
ments). In addition, most power generation fuel cycles involve significant 
impacts on the health and deaths of humans. These impacts raise a moral 
dilemma; to what extent should we treat humans as means to an end (utility) 
or as ends in themselves? Such a question should ideally be resolved within 
the realms of public discourse. The social choice problem with respect to 
many energy and environmental issues is thus, first of all, about advancing 
common ways of understanding what the pertinent issues are about. This 
implies that environmental research in the social science field must increas-
ingly address the instruments and content of political and moral debate and 
not simply the technicalities of established valuation methods. In other words, 
the process may count every bit as much as the outcome (Sagoff 1998). 
The above discussion also adds a new perspective to the observed 
differences in reported valuation estimates between the abatement cost 
approach and the damage cost approach. The two methods involve different 
ethical bases. For example, the damage estimates developed within the 
ExtemE-project are considered ex ante, i.e., the damages themselves determine 
whether one power source is 'better' than another, while the estimates derived 
using the abatement cost approach are ex post, i.e., the price is an outcome 
of a political process and does not play a direct role in the decision. The 
damages developed in 'advance' (as in the ExtemE-project) may therefore 
not be directly comparable to 'implicit' estimates that are based on the cost 
of abating as revealed by decision makers since they reflect different reasoning 
processes. Policy makers may in their formulation of regulations very well 
rely on other ethical foundations than economic welfare theory. 
5. A Summary of the Main Findings 
This article has analysed past research efforts on valuing the externalities, 
and primarily the environmental costs, arising from power generation. In 
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doing this we have raised a set of conceptual and, to some extent, unresolved 
issues, but in general we have focused especially on two interrelated questions: 
(a) the wide disparity in external costs reported in previous studies, and the 
extent to which this represents a problem; and (b) the usefulness of previous 
valuation efforts for policy purposes. 
A number of plausible reasons for the reported wide disparity of estimates 
for specific fuels were identified : e.g., differences in scope, the use of 
varying technical and economic assumptions, and the choice of methodology 
(i.e., the abatement cost versus the damage cost approach). The use of different 
scopes and input parameter assumptions (and thus distinctly different reported 
external cost estimates) is often justified. For instance, if people are unlikely 
to possess developed preference structures for certain environmental impacts, 
either because they have little past experience or the impact involves far-
reaching and unknown consequences, it may be better to refrain from 
monetary valuation. Moreover, since different sites and different technologies 
incur various damages (even for the same fuel) the use of different parameter 
assumptions regarding, say, emission intensities and economic values is 
motivated. Economic valuations are, and should be, context-dependent and 
project-specific. This suggests that any notion of some 'total' cost of power 
generation appears invalid. 
However, the above may create problems for the use of externality 
estimates for policy purposes. People in general and indeed policy makers 
often 'have the expectation that external costs are as simple to understand as 
price tags in a store,' (Krewitt 2002:847), but in practice the empirical 
estimates of external costs have provided few general guidelines on how to 
allocate public funds (i.e., subsidies, R&D support) between different power 
sources. In addition, due to the context-dependent and site-specific 
characteristics of economic valuation estimates it may be impossible (or at 
least very impractical) to implement uniform taxes based on external cost 
estimates. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the valuation efforts have 
been in vain. Previous studies have taught us a lot about the environmental 
impacts of power generation (in particular health effects), and even if much 
of this knowledge cannot be transferred directly into a tax or a regulation it 
should be able to impact upon the focus of the political debate and ultimately 
on policy decisions. 
Finally, the usefulness of previous economic valuation efforts for policy 
purposes is also complicated by the fact that according to the welfare 
economics literature, valuation builds on: (a) relatively restrictive behavioural 
assumptions: and (b) the idea that the ethical principle guiding social choice 
is economic efficiency. However, if these assumptions are relaxed it may 
have profound consequences for the use of environmental valuation studies. 
Since people are likely to express public rather than private (i.e., utility 
maximising) preferences towards some external impacts, the social choice 
between different power sources must increasingly be made within the realms 
of public discourse where additional ethical principles may play a role. This 
also implies that there may exist a fundamental_ ethical difference between 
the abatement cost approach, in which externality estimates are revealed 
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from the results of the political decision process, and the damage cost 
approach in which the same estimates are drawn directly from people's 
expressed preferences (as indicated in, for instance, contingent valuation 
studies). 
In addition, the view that economic efficiency is the ultimate goal of 
policy is not likely to be shared by all lay people and politicians. This means 
that, in contrast to many economists, they are likely to be more indulged to 
promote: (a) a much broader definition of externalities than that available in 
the literature; and (b) the use of green power markets as a substitute for 
external cost assessment and implementation. Overall, this suggests that in 
addition to further methodological work, there is a need to direct future 
research efforts also to the apparent incompatibility between the intended use 
of external cost assessments, its theoretical foundations and its practical use 
in shaping policy decisions. 
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